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Abstract: 
Although Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) are as important to the world 
economy as exports, the extensive literature on trade costs has no strong 
parallel for FDI. Data are hard to come by, and many of the barriers to FDI 
are unobservable. This paper circumvents the problem by inferring the 
barriers to FDI that are consistent with observed FDI data. I describe the 
distribution and evolution of these barriers to FDI between pairs of 28 OECD 
countries from 1985 to 2008. On average, barriers to FDI were halved every 
4.8 years. Geography is a key determinant, but GDP per capita also plays a 
leading role. Decomposing the growth in FDI, I show that it has mainly been 
driven by lower bilateral barriers (75%), not by economic growth, and that 
bilateral FDI stocks will tend to crowd each other out, lowering their yearly 
growth by -3%.  
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1 Introduction 
The last few decades have seen a surge in Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). For the 
average OECD country, inward FDI stocks amount to 49% of GDP in 2009, up from 14% 
in 1980. Total sales from the foreign affiliates set up through FDI have nearly twice the 
value of world exports. Foreign direct investments (FDI) have in sum become as important 
to the global economy as trade in goods.
1
 Despite this large and growing importance, the 
extensive literature on trade costs has no strong parallel for FDI. The reason for this gap in 
our knowledge is that many of the costs of doing FDI are difficult to observe or quantify: 
costs of coordinating with foreign affiliates, complex laws on foreign ownership and 
cultural barriers, just to name a few. 
This paper circumvents the problem of unobservability and is the first to provide data 
on the barriers to FDI between pairs of OECD countries from 1985 to 2008. Rather than 
trying to compile data on FDI barriers, I infer from observed FDI stocks at what level the 
barriers must be, by imposing a minimal structure with broad empirical and theoretical 
support, the gravity equation. I describe the magnitude and variation of FDI barriers across 
country pairs and their decline over time and examine how much of the barriers to FDI we 
can account for with previously used proxies like distance or GDP per capita. I show how 
declining barriers can explain 75% of the growth in FDI from 1985 to 2008, an intriguing 
contrast to a corresponding study by Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2008) showing that only 
33% of the growth in goods trade from 1950 to 2000 is attributable to falling trade costs. 
As a final contribution, I show that bilateral FDI stocks tend to crowd each other out, on 
average depressing their yearly growth by 3% (log). This crowding out, which arises be-
cause a country only has a limited stock of suitable targets that foreign firms can acquire, 
raises concerns of misspecification in previous FDI studies.
2
 
The inference procedure used to compute the FDI barriers is presented in section 1.2. 
The inference relies on the gravity equation, one of the strongest empirical regularities in 
economics, stating that bilateral stocks of FDI (like trade flows) can be described by a log-
linear relationship involving sender and receiver-specific variables (GDP per capita, 
population etc.), and bilateral variables (distance, whether two countries speak a common 
language, etc.).
3
 The method works regardless of what theoretical foundation one believes 
is behind the gravity equation. I use the theory developed in Head and Ries (2008) to make 
the exposition clearer; using the alternative theories presented in Kleinert and Toubal 
(2010) would give the same interpretation of the measure.  
The inferred measures, denoted 
FDI
ijt , are the pair-wise aggregate barriers that are 
consistent with how much FDI that actually takes place between the two countries i and j at 
                                               
1 The FDI shares of GDP come from the UNCTAD database. Among others, Mariscal (2010) documents and 
examines the ratio of affiliate sales to exports. 
2 Example: A Spanish firm wishes to acquire a firm in The UK. In 2007, the UK is more open to FDI (and 
therefore acquisitions) from third-countries than in 1988, and the Spanish firm therefore has a lower chance of 
actually winning the bid for the UK firm in 2007. In this way, the Spanish stock of FDI in the UK is 
depressed. If this effect is not controlled for, the FDI-depressing effect of e.g. distance will be over-estimated. 
3 In the references cited at the end of the introduction, the overall fit (R²) of a gravity equation for FDI is 
between 0.6 and 0.9. 
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time t. The measured FDI barriers are therefore net barriers, if two countries have strong 
strategic complementarities, it will count as a lower barrier to FDI.  
For easier comparison and to account for barriers that are so high that no FDI takes 
place, I use an inverse measure, giving the attractiveness of owning an affiliate in the other 
country relative to owning a domestic firm. If 05.0
FDI
ijt , foreign firms in the pair are on 
net 0.05 times as attractive to own as domestic firms. As the wording suggests, the bilateral 
FDI barrier is measured relative to a domestic barrier; without imposing additional 
structure, barriers to FDI are inseparable from a domestic bias in firm ownership. The 
measure is symmetric, 
FDI
ijt  is the geometric average of country i's barrier to j and j's to i. 
The symmetry, along with data availability, is the reason for constricting the analysis to 
OECD countries. 
The descriptive results in section 1.3.1 show that in 2008, barriers to FDI were lowest 
between the Netherlands and the UK, 14.0
FDI
ijt . The median barrier in 2008 was 
between France and Turkey, at 0015.0FDIijt . On average, bilateral barriers to FDI 
decline by 14% per year (logarithmic rate), so that the barrier is halved every 4.8 years. It is 
hardly surprising that there are ―improbable‖ pairs of countries, with very high FDI 
barriers. For example, in 2008, the OECD's highest finite FDI barrier is between Iceland 
and South Korea, 
71044.6 FDIijt . Firms in South Korea clearly see very little benefit in 
investing in Iceland, and vice versa. But this is precisely the strength of the inference 
methodology: It can point out the country pairs where firms surprisingly do carry out FDI, 
despite being far apart, not speaking the same language, etc., and suggest which variables 
we might have omitted. For example, why is the FDI barrier between Denmark and 
Portugal a thousand times lower than it is between Sweden and Portugal?  
Using my inferred barriers as a dependent variable, section 1.4 examines how well 
observable variables like distance, common language and GDP can explain the barriers to 
FDI; I also experiment with a proxy for whether countries have similar industrial structures. 
The variables are all significant and have the expected signs. The R² of such a regression is 
0.84, but the fit drops markedly without country fixed effects. The estimated country fixed 
effects suggest that a country has lower domestic bias in firm ownership (or equivalently, 
lower average barriers to FDI), if it has low corporate taxes, high GDP per capita or English 
as main language. 
As a compliment to the bilateral FDI barriers, section 1.5 presents an inferred measure 
of a country's aggregate inward barriers to FDI. Building on Head and Ries (2008), this 
measure, denoted
FDI
it , can be interpreted as how difficult foreign firm ownership is 
relative to domestic firm ownership in country i. It is the dramatic decline in this measure 
that suggest that FDI crowding out is an issue that must be accounted for; in a gravity 
equation with bilateral FDI stocks, a possibility is country-year fixed effects or country-
specific trends. A decomposition in section 1.6 reveals that on average, the 41% yearly log-
growth in bilateral FDI stocks consists of a 31% decline in FDI barriers, a 13% growth in 
domestic capital, and a -3% crowding-out effect. 
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The inference method, which this paper is the first to apply to FDI, has frequently 
been used to measure trade costs. Inferred trade costs were first introduced by Head and 
Ries (2001), subsequent applications include: Describing the distribution and evolution of 
trade costs geographically, historically or across industries (Eaton and Kortum (2005), 
Novy (2008), Jacks, Meissner, and Novy (2008, 2010, 2011), Novy and Chen (2011) and 
McGowan and Milner (2011)) and calibrating models in economic geography (Head and 
Mayer (2004), Combes, Mayer and Thisse (2008)) and in international trade (Eaton, 
Kortum, Neiman and Romalis (2010)). Costs of FDI are arguably even harder to observe 
than trade costs, so indirect measurement is likely to be as enlightening as it has been for 
trade in goods. 
Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009) carry out an inference procedure similar in spirit 
to the present paper. They examine country-level barriers to foreign firm ownership in 
developing countries, and how removing these barriers may bring growth and welfare gains 
because foreign management know-how can make more productive use of a developing 
country’s assets. To infer these gains from foreign firm ownership, they calculate the ratio 
of net FDI stocks over capital (a measure somewhat similar to 
FDI
it ) and estimate that 
foreign firm ownership brings developing countries 2% closer to developed countries’ 
output; removing barriers to firm ownership would further increase welfare with 5%. 
Although the paper shares the idea of inferring FDI barriers with the present paper, the 
focuses and methodologies are different: Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009) examine 
country-level barriers in developing countries, not pair-wise barriers between OECD 
countries. And to infer growth and welfare effects, Burstein and Monge-Naranjo must rely 
on a more elaborate (and restrictive) model than simply the empirical regularity of the 
gravity equation. 
Multiple studies have used gravity-type regressions to look for determinants of 
bilateral FDI. Examples include Eaton and Tamura's (1994) study of factor endowments 
and region-specific effects, Wei (2000)'s analysis of corruption, information proxies as in 
Loungani, Mody, Razin and Sadka (2003), Mutti and Grubert's (2004) study of the effects 
of taxes and wages, and institutional factors in Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet and Mayer (2007). 
Distance, common borders, common languages and past colonial ties are included through-
out the literature; Head and Ries (2008) argue that distance proxies for monitoring costs, 
and Crozet, Mayer and Mucchielli (2004) show how firms often set up affiliates just on the 
other side of a common border. My extension of the gravity equation methodology 
provides a complement to these studies by allowing an examination of the aggregate 
barriers to FDI, rather than considering each barrier separately, and by allowing some FDI 
barriers to be unobservable.  
2 Inferring the Barriers to FDI 
The method of inferring bilateral barriers relies on the gravity equation, one of the most 
well-established empirical regularities in economics. The inference procedure does not rely 
on any particular theory for why the gravity equation holds for FDI, but with a theoretical 
framework the mechanisms and properties of the openness measures are more clearly 
exposed. Subsections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 describe the theoretical framework and subsection 
1.2.3 describes how the inference procedure is taken to the data. 
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2.1 A Theoretical Framework 
Consider the gravity equation for FDI derived in Head and Ries (2008). Their underlying 
model concerns mergers and acquisitions (M&A), which is the bulk of FDI flows, 
especially among developed countries. A firm in country i wishes to acquire a firm in 
country j, it makes a bid for the firm, and if the offer is good enough, the firm in i purchases 
(or merges with) the firm in j. In the aggregate, a gravity equation emerges: The predicted 
stock of FDI that firms in i own in j, Fij, is 
 
  1/exp  jjmiijiij BKsDF   (1.1) 
 
μi is the average valuation that firms in country i put on any asset, a higher average 
valuation (for instance if the country is rich) means that firms will be willing to pay more 
for all assets, increasing their expected stock of FDI in any country. The variance of the 
valuations is denoted by σ. These valuations are affected by Dij, a vector of bilateral 
factors Dij weighted with their coefficients θ. Bilateral factors include both observables 
such as distance and language barriers, and unobservables like cultural barriers or 
monitoring costs. 
If more of the world's firms are located in i, i will also win bids more often and own 
more assets in any country, this effect is captured by 
m
is , the share of the world's firms 
located in i. Kj is the capital stock in j, all else being equal, the more firms there are to buy 
in j, the higher will be the (absolute) value of firms owned by foreigners. The term Bj
–1
, 
"bidder competition", captures third country effects: If firms from other countries bid 
intensively for firms in j, firms in i will have a harder time winning the bids, lowering Fij. 
Bidder competition is the FDI counterpart to inward multilateral resistance introduced by 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for trade in goods. It is an aggregate of country j's 
barriers:    
M
h
m
hjhhj sDB 1 /exp   . 
The method of inferring the bilateral factors Dij from observed stocks of FDI (Fij) 
relies on the fact that the theory also has a prediction of country i's "stock of FDI in itself". 
That is, how much of the capital stock is still on domestic hands, after both foreign and 
domestic firms have made their bids for firms in i. Domestically owned capital stock, Fii, 
will be given by 
 
  1/exp  jjmiijiii BKsDF    (1.2) 
 
The same factors affect Fii and Fij. There might be country-specific reasons why firms 
in i place particular value on domestic assets, captured by Dii. These "home ownership 
biases" turn out to be quantitatively important. 
Consider the measure 
 
jjii
jiijFDI
ij
FF
FF
   
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The domestically and foreignly owned capital stocks are determined by the same variables, 
which all enter multiplicatively. The index therefore simplifies to 
 
   
   


jiij
jjiiFDI
ij
DD
DD
expexp
expexp
  
  
With the theoretical framework, the key properties of the inferred openness measure 
become apparent. First of all, country-specific variables have cancelled out, and we are left 
with the bilateral factors that make up the net barriers between i and j. More precisely, 
FDI
ijt  measures the inverse of the net cost of holding foreign capital between country i and 
country j. If 10.0
FDI
ijt , then residents in country i consider owning firms in country j 
0.10 times as attractive as owning firms at home, and vice versa. To express the number as 
a barrier, take the inverse, it is on net (0.10)
-1
=10 times more costly to own firms abroad in 
the pair than owning firms at home. (The inverse measure is chosen in line with most work 
on inferred trade barriers and facilitates comparison across country pairs).  
The cancelling out of country-specific factors is the basic idea behind the inference 
method. The method works whenever the country-specific factors enter multiplicatively, as 
they do in a gravity equation. The validity of the procedure relies on the empirical fit of the 
gravity equation for FDI; whether the particular theory used here is valid or not is not 
crucial. 
A second property of the inferred measure is suggested by the phrasing in the 
example: an international barrier is always measured relative to a domestic one. Bilateral 
barriers cannot (and perhaps should not) be distinguished from a home bias in firm 
ownership (Dii  and Djj). As an example, Poland turns out to have high barriers to FDI, or 
high home bias. Reasons may be that Polish capital is unattractive to foreigners or that 
Polish firms face liquidity constraints when seeking to set up or acquire firms abroad. This 
paper considers these impediments part of the barrier to FDI. Nevertheless, as outlined 
below, aggregate domestic bias (outward and inward combined) can be separated from 
purely bilateral barriers by regressing 
FDI
ijt  on country fixed effects. 
A third and more problematic property is that the inferred openness between i and j, 
will be the geometric mean of how open country i is to country j and how open country j is 
to country i. If the two countries have similar openness, the average is a good measure, it 
will be less informative for country pairs with asymmetric barriers. That, along with data 
limitations, is the reason for restricting the current study to OECD countries. 
Fourth, 
FDI
ijt  measures aggregate net openness; all bilateral costs or benefits of FDI, 
whether observable or not, are included and weighted with their coefficients: 
 
Dij = 1d1ij + 2d2ij + 3d3ij + … 
 
The advantage of inferring the FDI costs rather than compiling observable costs are clear: It 
gives an easy to compute measure of the overall net openness to FDI, which is what matters 
for investment decisions (a tautological statement, because the measure is calculated from 
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actual investments). It includes the impact of unobservable barriers or benefits. The 
measure is comparable across country pairs and over time.
4
 
The static model in the theoretical exposition conceals a fifth property of the inferred 
barriers: 
FDI
ijt  is calculated on the basis of FDI stocks, and if these stocks take time to 
adjust to changes in FDI barriers, 
FDI
ijt  will measure the barrier with a lag. It is unclear, 
however, whether FDI stocks actually do take time to adjust; annual fluctuations in FDI 
stocks can be very large.  
2.2 Inferring Country-level Inward Barriers to FDI 
The theoretical model in Head and Ries (2008) suggests a compliment to the bilateral 
measures, a country's aggregate inward barriers to FDI. Consider the fraction of a country's 
total capital stock which is on domestic hands: 
 
i
iiFDI
i
K
F
   
  
The share of a country's capital which is domestically owned is a quite intuitive way 
of measuring a country's inward FDI barriers. If capital is acquired by foreigners through 
acquisitions, Fii falls, if new capital is constructed through greenfield FDI, Ki rises, with Fii 
unchanged. 
The measure also has a theoretical interpretation. Using (1.2) above, 
FDI
i  can be 
written as 
 
 
  i
ii
M
h
m
hjhh
m
iiiiFDI
i
B
b
sD
sD




 1 /exp
/exp


, (1.3) 
 
where   miiiiii sDb   /exp  summarizes the strength of domestic bids, and Bi is the 
―bidder competition‖.  1,0FDIi  is therefore a measure of the relative strength of 
domestic bidders, the higher 
FDI
i  the higher their advantage over foreign bidders when 
wanting to acquire domestic firms. If a country has high inward barriers to FDI (Diiθ is 
lower than Dihθ h ≠ i), domestic bidders will be favored. In this manner, 
FDI
i  is an 
aggregate of the country's barriers to FDI. The measure is not entirely neutral to size or 
                                               
4 Because the inferred barrier is an aggregate, it does not have a meaningful counterfactual. We can compare 
the aggregate barrier to FDI between Portugal and Spain to the one between Australia and New Zealand, we 
can use regression analysis to examine how much distance can explain of the aggregate barriers, but it does 
not make sense to ask what happens if we remove the aggregate barrier to FDI.  
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wealth, however. If a country is rich (implying higher average valuations, μi) or has 
relatively many firms (high mis ), 
FDI
i  will increase as well.
5
  
2.3 Implementing the Inference Procedure 
Data on bilateral FDI stocks, Fij, are readily available, Fii is more problematic. The 
precision of inferred openness depends on how well a country's investment stock in itself, 
Fii, is measured. The model of Head and Ries (2008) suggests computing a country's FDI 
with itself as a residual: the amount of capital in country i, which is still on domestic hands 
after all foreign firms have acquired firms in i. Following Head and Ries (2008) and 
Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009), I calculate a measure of a country's capital stock, iK
~
, 
in the standard way, by compiling investments from the national accounts using a perpetual 
inventory method. Investment data is taken from the OECD database (gross fixed capital 
formation); I subtract investments in dwellings to get rid of the most obvious non-business 
investments. 
The depreciation rate is set to d = 0.07, and as an initial guess of a country's capital 
stock for the first year, I use an inverted production function: Ki0 = (Pop i0)
1.022
 
(Yi0/Popi0)
0.964
, where Yi0 is GDP at the date from which investment data is available. The 
guess is based on Head and Ries (2008)'s finding that 93% of the variation in their measure 
of capital stock can be explained with a log-log regression yielding the relation above. I use 
real investments and then inflate the capital measures each year, using the ratio of nominal 
to real investments, to have measures comparable to the nominal FDI stocks. 
Because foreign firms have merged with or acquired firms in country i, some of this 
capital stock will not be domestically owned. To get to domestically owned capital, we 
must subtract the stock of inward mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in i; if a share 
AM
i
&  of 
the stock of inward FDI in i come in the form of mergers and acquisitions, we can compute 
Fii as: 
 



ij
ji
AM
iiii FKF
&~    
 
As an estimate of 
AM
i
&  I use the average share of M&A in FDI inflows to country i from 
1988 to 2006. 
The total capital stock in i, disregarding ownership and including what comes in as 
greenfield FDI, is given by 
 
                                               
5 The way the total capital measure is constructed, Greenfield FDI is counted as an increase in Ki. With this 
construction, a country with a large inflow of Greenfield FDI is classified as having fiercer bidder competition 
(but also as having a larger stock of total capital). The rationale is that with the addition of new foreign-owned 
capital from a given country, each of the inward bilateral FDI stocks from other countries makes up a lower 
share of total capital. 
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


ij
jiiii FFK . 
 
It is this total capital measure that is used to infer a country's overall barriers to inward FDI 
defined in (1.3). 
3 Data and Descriptive Results 
Data on bilateral FDI stocks Fij are taken from the OECD online database. The time period 
is 1985-2008 with some holes due to lack of data. To maximize data coverage I use both 
inward and outward FDI data. Due to the difficulties of dealing with countries with 
asymmetric barriers, the analysis is confined to OECD members, data for Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, Chile, Slovenia, Israel and Estonia are unavailable. The sample consists of pairs of 
these 28 countries: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea (South), Mexico, The 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, the USA. Available data allow the construction of 
FDI
ijt for 
324 pairs with varying time series length for a total of 4727 observations (out of 9072 
possible observations for 378 possible pairs). 
Domestic investments used to construct domestic capitals also come from the OECD 
database, "gross domestic capital formation" minus the subcategory "dwellings", which 
should not count as business sector capital. Population and GDP per capita data used to 
construct the initial capital guess are from the same database, GDP per capita is in US$ 
constant prices, constant PPPs (2000 is the OECD base year). M&A and FDI flow data 
used to estimate the share of M&A in FDI stocks come from the UNCTAD database, the 
time coverage is from 1987 to 2006. 
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3.1 The Size and Evolution of FDI Barriers 
  
Figure 1 plots 
FDI
ijt  for 7 
country pairs. In 1985, 
Canada-USA was the most 
integrated pair in the world, 
owning foreign affiliates in the 
other country was 
023.085,, 
FDI
USCan  as 
attractive as owning domestic 
firms. As seen, however, FDI 
barriers have declined more 
quickly for several other pairs. 
By 1995 both Norway-Sweden 
and the UK-Nethelands were 
more integrated, with the latter 
pair setting the world record 
for low FDI barriers in 2007: 
227.007,, 
FDI
UKNL . 
The FDI barrier between 
Portugal and Sweden is almost 
a thousand times higher than 
the one between Portugal and 
Denmark. This difference is 
striking and highlights the 
usefulness of inferring FDI 
barriers, rather than trying to 
collect observable data or run 
gravity regressions: we would 
hardly have expected or discovered such a large discrepancy. The difference is likely driven 
by some unobservable or hitherto unstudied variable. A guess could be that Danish 
manufacturing firms to a very large degree used to operate in industries, where it has been 
attractive to relocate production to Portugal.  
0.0000001
0.000001
0.00001
0.0001
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
1985 1995 2005 1985 1995 2005
Korea-Italy
Portugal-Sweden
UK-Netherlands
Canada-USA
Portugal-Denmark
Germany-France
Norway-Sweden
0.023
0.066
0.227
Figure 1: Bilateral openenss to FDI, selected pairs
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.15
10 
 
Figure 2 gives an overview of the distribution of 
FDI
ijt  in 1988, 1997 and 2006 on a 
common log scale; black bars represent pairs for which there is data in all three years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The distributions have their masses in the middle and upper end, with a long tail of pairs 
with very high barriers. In 2006, there is also a substantial number of observed zero values, 
corresponding to a barrier so large that no investments are worthwhile. It is hardly 
surprising that there are ―improbable‖ pairs with very high barriers, (1988's lowest 
FDI
ijt  is 
Austria-Finland and 2006's is Iceland-Korea), but it is noteworthy that these pairs are the 
exception in the OECD.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1988 
1997 
2006 
The three bars show the cross-sections of ijt
FDI
 in 1988, 1997 and 2006 on a common axis. 
Black observations are pairs for which there is data in all three years. The grey 
observations do not represent the same pairs. In 1997 and 2006 there were also 16 and 41 
observed zeroes, respectively.   
Figure 2: Cross-sections of FDI
ijt  
―Initial value‖ on the x-axis is the value of ijt
FDI
 in the first year for which data is 
available for the ij-pair. The y-axis then gives the average annual log-growth rate in 
ijt
FDI
 for the pair. Next to the axes are plotted univariate distributions for ijt
FDI
 and the 
growth rates. 
‖○‖: pairs with an emerging country 
‖×‖: pairs with a catch-up country 
‖+‖: pairs of rich countries 
log-growth in 
FDI
ijt  
Figure 3: Convergence or divergence in FDI barriers? 
initial value 
 of 
FDI
ijt  
(log scale) 
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Let us examine in more detail how FDI barriers evolve over time. Figure 3 is a type of 
figure often used for convergence analyses. It helps us determine how much FDI barriers 
decline across country pairs, whether the declines vary with the countries’ income, and 
whether the initial level of FDI barriers matters for how quickly FDI barriers decline.  
The annualized log growth rates of 
FDI
ijt are displayed on the y-axis. The x-axis 
shows the value of 
FDI
ijt  for the first year for which data is available for the ij-pair, (e.g. 
1985 for Canada-USA and 2000 for Slovakia-Spain). Country pairs are divided into 3 
groups, according to the countries’ GDP per capita: If one of the countries in a pair is either 
Czech Rep., Slovak Rep., Hungary, Poland, Greece, Turkey or Mexico (―emerging 
countries‖), the pair is marked with a ―○‖.Of the remaining pairs, if one of the countries is 
either Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Korea or Spain ("catch-up countries"), they are 
marked with an ―×‖. Otherwise the pair is marked with a ―+‖, indicating that both countries 
are wealthy throughout the sample period ("rich countries").  
If pairwise FDI barriers converge towards the same level, there should be a 
downward-sloping relationship in Figure 3, if there is divergence (meaning that already 
integrated countries keep integrating faster than the rest), the relationship should be 
positive. If anything, the graph indicates convergence (the correlation between initial levels 
and growth rates is -0.21), but the dominant picture is one of more variance for lower initial 
levels of 
FDI
ijt , it is easier to have large variations in growth rates for low initial levels. On 
average, pairs where one of the countries is a ―catch-up‖ or ―emerging‖ country have seen 
larger declines in FDI barriers than the richer countries, as is seen when comparing the 
marginal distributions of growth rates (y-axis on Figure 3) or looking at the summary 
statistics in Table 1:
6
 
 
 
In sum, the decline in FDI barriers in the OECD has been quite dramatic, with barriers 
on average halving every 4.8 years. Although there is variation across pairs, the dominant 
picture is a universal decline in FDI barriers, likely because of technological developments 
or policy liberalizations that are common across the OECD. There is some tendency for 
                                               
6 The differences between the means are not statistically significant. 
Table 1: Summary statistics of log growth rates in 
FDI
ijt  
 average (std. dev.) Half-life 
Rich countries (+) 0.104 (0.066) 6.7 years 
Catch-up countries (o) 0.141  (0.119) 4.9 years 
Emerging countries (×) 0.187  (0.176) 3.7 years 
Half-life is the average time it takes for FDI barriers to fall by 50%. 
Symbols refer to Figure 3.  
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more peripheral countries to have a faster decline in their FDI barriers, catching up with the 
richest.  
4 Observable and Unobservable FDI Barriers 
From countries shown in Figure 1, the conclusion from the existing empirical literature on 
FDI barriers seems valid: distance, languages, and GDP are important determinants of the 
barriers to FDI. On the other hand, it is also clear that these variables do not tell the entire 
story; they can hardly explain the rapid decline in FDI barriers, or curious outliers like 
Denmark-Portugal. This section examines how much of the barriers to FDI we can relate to 
observable barriers or proxies emphasized by the previous literature. First, section 1.4.1 
gives a presentation of the estimation strategy and relevant variables, results follow in 
section 1.4.2. Home biases in firm ownership receive particular attention in section 1.4.3. 
4.1 Estimation Strategy 
Maintaining the assumption that the components of FDI barriers enter multiplicatively (in 
line with the derivations in section 1.2.1 and with estimation of gravity equations in 
general), 
 
   
   


jiij
jjiiFDI
ij
DD
DD
expexp
expexp
 , 
 
I split the bilateral FDI openness into observable and unobservable variables: 
 
     
    .exp
expexpexp
7
1
322
ijttjtit
ijijijij
FDI
ij
GDPGDP
colonylangneighdist






 (1.4) 
 
Based on previous studies (see the introduction), I use the following observable 
variables: distij, the great arc distance in kilometers between the capitals in country i and 
country j; neighij, langij and colonyij are dummy variables indicating, respectively, whether 
countries i and j are neighbors (sharing a border or having only a small body of water 
between them), share a main language, and whether the two countries have been one in the 
past or whether one was a colony of the other. These variables are taken from the CEPII 
database, note that they are all symmetric, xij = xji. Countries i and j's GDP, GDPit and 
GDPjt, are taken from the OECD database and measured at constant PPPs and prices (base 
year 2000). 
Because 
FDI
ijt  is symmetric 
FDI
jit
FDI
ijt   , we would expect i and j's per GDPs to 
enter with the same coefficient, as imposed. In some specifications, I split GDPs into per 
capita GDPs and populations at their 1985 levels, both are taken from the OECD database. 
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Year dummies γt capture the overall positive trend in 
FDI
ijt . The "non-trend" unobservable 
barriers, ηijt, are lumped together in an error term.
 7
  
A widespread econometric approach to estimating a relationship like (1.4) is to take 
logs on both sides and run a linear regression. In an influential recent paper Santos Silva 
and Tenreyro (2006) lay out the extreme regularity conditions that this procedure requires 
to be valid: All conditional moments of ηijt must be independent of the explanatory 
variables, otherwise the estimates from the log-log model will not be consistent estimates of 
the parameters of the multiplicative relationship above. Of particular concern is 
heteroskedasticity in ηijt. 
Examinations of actual values vs. fitted values from log-log regressions make it clear 
that these regularity conditions are not met when estimating (1.4) in log-log. I therefore use 
the alternative estimation procedure that Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) suggest, Poisson 
pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) using (1.4) in its multiplicative form. Appendix 1 
provides more details on the bias that arises when estimating (1.4) in logs.  
The domestic biases in capital ownership, Diiθ and Djjθ, are part of the inferred 
barriers to FDI. As argued above, distinguishing a high domestic bias in capital holdings 
from a high average barrier to FDI is conceptually difficult and practically impossible 
without imposing a lot of structure. I treat domestic biases in two ways, with different 
implications for the identification of the estimated coefficients. Table 2a in the next 
subsection presents the results. 
It could be that a country's domestic bias (or average FDI barrier) is well explained by 
its geography, how widespread its main languages are and how wealthy and large it is. That 
is the assumption behind specifications (1) and (3) in Table 2a. In specifications (2) and (4), 
the error term is specified as ηijt=exp(ci)exp(cj)νijt, ci and cj being country dummies that 
cancel out the domestic biases. With country fixed effects included in this manner, the 
estimation identifies parameters using only the distribution of bilateral FDI openness, 
conditional on each country's average bilateral FDI openness. 
                                               
7 The symmetric structure of ijt
FDI means that some asymmetric variables such as tax differences or relative 
technology levels between countries i and j are cumbersome to include. I have chosen to let country fixed 
effects account for these variables instead, see the discussion below and section 1.4.3. Using country fixed 
effects also precludes the use of country-specific variables with little time variation, such as R&D-intensity.  
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4.2 Observable FDI Barriers 
 
Table 2a shows four different specifications for estimating (1.4), specification (4) is my 
preferred. The fit of the regression is dramatically improved when controlling for countries' 
home bias in firm ownership (the R² is computed as  2ˆ, FDIijtFDIijtcorr  . Distance increases 
the barriers to FDI; although an elasticity of 0.47 is perhaps not dramatically large, the 
explanatory power of distance is consistently large across specifications. On top of the 
distance effect, two countries that are neighbors have half the FDI barrier of other pairs; 
Table 2a. The components of bilateral barriers to FDI.   Dependent variable: ijt
FDI  
Specification (1) (2, FE) (3) (4, FE) 
 coeff. 
(std. 
error) 
%-effect 
[z-stat] 
coeff.  
(std. 
error) 
%-effect 
[z-stat] 
coeff.  
(std. 
error) 
%-effect 
[z-stat] 
coeff.  
(std. 
error) 
%-effect 
[z-stat] 
Distanceij -0.69 
(0.03)a 
 
[-21.8] 
-0.47 
(0.03)a 
 
[-18.5] 
-0.74 
(0.04)a 
  
[-22.7] 
-0.47  
(0.03)a 
  
[-19.0] 
Neighborsij (0,1) -0.07  
(0.09)  
 
[-0.8] 
 0.40 
(0.04)a 
49%  
[10.6] 
 -0.06 
(0.09) 
 
[-0.8] 
 0.39 
(0.05)a 
48%  
[10.5] 
Common languageij (0,1)  1.16  
(0.08)
a
  
218% 
[14.2] 
 0.49 
(0.06)
a
 
63%  
[8.8] 
 0.35 
(0.09)
a
 
46% 
[4.9] 
 0.49 
(0.06)
a
 
64%  
[8.8] 
Colonial pastij (0,1)  0.29 
(0.11)a 
34% 
[2.6] 
 1.21 
(0.07)a  
235% 
[17.1] 
 0.55 
(0.08)a 
73%  
[6.7] 
 1.21 
(0.09)a 
236% 
[17.3] 
GDPit×GDPjt  0.37 
(0.02)a 
 
[23.2] 
 0.44 
(0.15)a  
  
[3.6]     
(Per capita GDPit) 
 × (Per capita GDPjt)     
 3.20 
(0.12)a 
 
[31.1] 
 1.14 
(0.14)a 
  
[8.3] 
(Population in 1985i) 
 × (Population in 1985j)     
 0.31 
(0.02)a 
  
[21.8] 
 0.41 
(0.03)a  
  
[12.9] 
Year dummies (t) Yes  [sum 74.7] Yes  [sum 101.8] Yes  [sum 46.6] Yes  [sum 79.5] 
Country fixed effects  
(ci and cj). No Yes  [sum 277.6] No Yes  [sum 494.7] 
R2  0.254 0.837 0.432 0.839  
4727 observations. %-effect: Percentage change in ijt
FDI when independent variable goes from 0 to 1, calculated as 
exp(b) – 1. Estimation method: Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood, estimated coefficients are elasticities.   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Square parentheses t-statistics, corresponding to the explanatory variables' 
importance in explaining the variation in the dependent variable.    a : significant at the 1% level 
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when country-specific spurs and barriers to FDI are cancelled out, Crozet, Mayer and 
Mucchielli (2004)'s discovery that affiliates tend to cluster just across the border is 
quantitatively quite important. 
A very large reduction in FDI barriers comes with a past as a common country, the 
effect seems to be highly dependent on controlling for home bias. Including the Austro-
Hungarian empire and the Nordic countries, only 16 country pairs have colonial or common 
country pasts in the OECD, so it is remarkable that the variable is so important in 
explaining 
FDI
ijt . The common language coefficient changes dramatically across 
specifications, but an intuitive story fits the pattern: Controlling for population sizes but not 
for country fixed effects gives the lowest coefficient. A country with a widespread language 
has lower domestic bias in firm ownership. 
The idea behind separating GDP into per capita GDP and population is that they are 
likely to have distinct effects. A large market may allow more firms to recoup fixed costs of 
owning an affiliate there, as emphasized in the literature on proximity-concentration trade-
offs, see for instance Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). The population variable tries to 
capture this idea, although GDP per capita may still contain market size effects. In order to 
keep out effects correlated with population growth, populations are kept fixed at their 1985 
level. GDP per capita may also relate to the quality of a country's institutions, lowering the 
costs of having an affiliate there, see Wei (2000) and Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet and Mayer 
(2007). Also, firms in rich countries may simply own assets that are more attractive to 
foreigners, and firms in poorer countries may have problems raising enough funds for 
international acquisitions or greenfield investments. As a counterbalancing effect, wages 
are higher in rich countries, increasing the costs (both marginal and fixed) of serving them 
through local affiliates. 
Controlling for their effect on home bias, a subject which will be treated below, per 
capita GDP and population remain noteworthy determinants of the distribution of FDI 
barriers. Given their average barrier, countries tend to have 1.1% lower FDI barriers 
towards wealthier countries, the negative wealth effects from higher wages appear to be 
outweighed. And a larger market is more attractive, something which traditional gravity-
based studies of FDI determinants have a harder time identifying, because larger countries 
also ―mechanically‖ attract more FDI to satisfy their greater demand.  
In addition to the lower fit, the estimated coefficients also differ without country-fixed 
effects. With some caution, because cross-coefficient effects may play a role, we can learn 
about the home biases by examining these changes. In addition to the language effect 
described just above, the most striking difference is in GDP per capita. Its large z-statistic 
and high positive elasticity in specification (3) suggest that it is an important determinant of 
home bias. Population also has a much higher z-statistic, but the coefficient is slightly 
lower without fixed effects. It is plausible that a large market reduces domestic bias, but 
that the effect comes from adding up the ―by pair‖-effects that specification (4) identifies: 
no matter the size of their origin country, firms prefer investing in a foreign market if it is 
large, large markets therefore have their average barriers to FDI reduced. Note also that the 
fit of specification (3) with separate wealth and market size effects is much higher than that 
of specification (1). 
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The stronger distance effects in specifications (1) and (3) might pick up a remoteness 
effect: A country like Japan could suffer an additional increase in its FDI barriers, because 
its isolated location, far from most OECD countries, makes it an unattractive FDI partner, 
adding to the already large distance-related barriers with each individual country. The 
coefficient change may also reflect the vanished neighbor effect. 
The way 
FDI
ijt is constructed, a concern may be that a positive shock to domestic 
investments in a given year, without a corresponding increased inflow of FDI, will translate 
into higher FDI barriers with all the country's partners in that year. The inference procedure 
considers this shock to be part of the FDI barrier, but an obvious alternative way of dealing 
with the problem is to replace the country dummies with country-year dummies, i.e. to 
specify the error term and time trend as exp(γt)ηijt = exp(cit)exp(cjt)ζijt. Unfortunately, the 
Poisson estimation will not converge with the larger set of dummies. In Appendix 1, I do 
the log-log regression with country-year dummies also. The estimated coefficients do not 
change, except a dramatic increase in the population coefficient, although the variable has 
little explanatory power.  
The variables included in Table 2a do not capture if firms in a country have specific 
strategic interests in another country (at least for reasons unrelated to distance or wealth). 
At the cost of losing pairs involving Australia and Turkey (450 observations in total), I 
have constructed a proxy of these strategic interests, by looking at similarity in industry 
structure. Table 2b presents 
the results.  The new dummy 
variable ―similar industry‖ 
takes the value 1 if two 
countries have one or more of 
their three largest industries 
in common. I use data on 
gross industry output from 
the STAN database to 
construct the variable. 58% of 
all OECD country pairs have 
a similar industrial structure, 
if it is defined in this 
manner.
8
  
When controlling for 
country fixed effects in 
specification (6), the proxy 
for industry similarity is 
significant, 
FDI
ijt  rises with 
23% if countries have one or 
                                               
8 A number of industries have to be excluded, because they are common across too many countries. These are 
food products and beverages, construction, retailing and wholesale, real estate activities, health, and 
education. None of these industries have any separate effect on FDI barriers, if they are in top 3 in both 
countries in a pair. Finally, agriculture is excluded, otherwise the variable becomes insignificant.  
Table 2b. Industry similarity and bilateral FDI barriers.   
 Dependent variable: ijt
FDI  
Specification (5) (6, FE) 
 coeff. 
(std. error) 
%-effect 
[z-stat] 
coeff.  
(std. error) 
%-effect 
[z-stat] 
Similar industriesij 
(0,1) 
-0.02   
(0.06) 
 
[ -0.34] 
0.23  
(0.05) a 
26% 
[5.02 ] 
All variables from 
table 4, reg.3-4 
  
Year dummies (t) Yes   Yes   
Country fixed effects  
(ci and cj). 
No Yes  
R2  0.521 0.904 
Regressions (3) and (4) from Table 2a, with an additional variable that 
proxies for industry similarity. 4277 observations. %-effect: Percentage 
change in ijt
FDI when independent variable goes from 0 to 1, calculated as 
exp(b) – 1. 
Estimation method: Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood, estimated 
coefficients are elasticities.  a : significant at the 1% level. 
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more of their top 3 industries in common. Including the proxy for industry similarity does 
not affect the coefficients of the other explanatory variables (the distance coefficient does 
change, compared to Table 2a, however, because the many observations involving 
Australia are dropped).  
The results suggest that strategic complimentarities do reduce net FDI barriers. From 
this preliminary analysis, it is hard to determine how important strategic complimentarities 
are relative to distance or GDP per capita. Trying to generate better measures of industry 
similarity, perhaps from input-output tables, seems like a worthwhile endeavor. To the best 
of my knowledge there are no existing empirical studies of how strategic complimentarities 
shape aggregate FDI flows, save perhaps the appendix in Mariscal (2010).    
4.3 Country-Specific FDI Barriers 
The previous subsection established that the main determinants of the inferred barriers to 
FDI were country-specific factors; adding country fixed effects greatly improved the fit of 
the estimations in Table 2a. The estimated country fixed effects from the preferred 
specification (4) can be used to compute how much each country's average FDI barrier 
deviates from its expected value of 1. (Because the added variable for industry similarity is 
just a proxy, and including it requires dropping two countries, I use estimations from 
specification 4, not 6). The results are reported in Table 3, and they allow an assessment of 
how the variables that the previous subsection suggested were determinants of the country-
specific factors (per capita GDP, a country's geographical position and the prevalence of its 
language) aggregate up, and of what other factors may play a role: 
 
Table 3: Countries’ barriers to FDI, deviations from expected value 
Netherlands -84% UK -53% Germany -3% Mexico 193% 
Ireland -76% USA -45% Spain 2% Poland 225% 
Switzerland -74% Denmark -39% Italy 17% Turkey 288% 
New 
Zealand 
-74% France -37% Hungary 64% Czech Rep. 304% 
Sweden -65% Portugal -27% Austria 102% Slovak Rep. 391% 
Australia -60% Canada -16% Finland 107% Korea 488% 
Norway -54% Iceland -8% Japan 115% Greece 541% 
Deviations calculated using the country fixed effects in Table 2a, specification (4). A 
country’s expected value of FDI barriers (both inward and outward) is based on its geo-
graphical position, relative wealth and population, and whether it shares a language or a 
colonial past with other countries.
 
 
 
The three countries with the lowest barriers to FDI are all known for their lenient 
corporate taxes, having the lowest corporate taxes seems to be an important attractor of 
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FDI. Increasing abilities for companies to arbitrage tax payments across countries may 
drive part of the decline in aggregate FDI barriers.
9
 
GDP per capita does seem to be an important determinant of the percentage 
deviations, but it is far from the only factor. The relatively high ranks for Portugal and 
Spain might relate to their low wages (and hence low GDP per capita). English-speaking 
countries are well represented at the top; it seems that the benefits of speaking a global 
language compensates for a remote location for Australia and New Zealand. Remoteness 
hits much harder on Japan and South Korea, the low ranks of Finland and Greece could 
also be due to their location at the "corners" of Europe. 
5 Increasing Crowding Out of FDI 
A disadvantage of the analysis so far has been that the inference procedure for bilateral 
barriers to FDI lumps together inward and outward barriers. As outlined in section 1.2.2, a 
complimentary measure infers a country's overall inward barriers to FDI, it is calculated as 
the fraction of a country's capital stock, which is still domestically owned: 
itiit
FDI
it KF / . Figure 5 depicts 
FDI
it  for the 27 countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
9 Regarding computation of the deviations in Table 3: Depending on the country-pair observation, a country 
may enter as i or j in the regressions. Because ijt
FDI is symmetric, the distinction is arbitrary, but it gives rise 
to two estimated country fixed effects for each country h, call these, with a slight abuse of notation, cih and cjh 
These estimates should be mean-corrected (because the estimation may arbitrarily attribute the regression's 
constant to either i-dummies, j-dummies, year dummies or the constant term), and weighted according to how 
often a country appears as i or j in a pair. Country h's total fixed effect, FEh, is calculated as 
    jccjaicciaFE hhhhh  1 , where ah weights how frequently country h appears as i, and where 
ic  and jc  are the means across all cih and cjh estimates, respectively. The percentage deviation is then 
calculated as exp( –FEh) – 1. 
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The overall picture is one of significant declines in 
FDI
it , the advantage that domestic 
buyers have over foreign buyers has fallen. There are exceptions, however: Inward barriers 
in Japan, Korea and Finland remain high, and Ireland has no downward tendency in its 
already low aggregate barrier. 
An important implication follows from Figure 5. The model of Head and Ries (2008) 
points out the necessity of correcting for country differences in bidder competition when 
estimating gravity equations for bilateral FDI stocks. Otherwise, regressions will suffer 
from omitted variables bias, as higher overall openness will tend to depress bilateral FDI 
stocks. Figure 5 shows that the solution applied by Head and Ries (2008), country fixed 
effects, is insufficient: 
FDI
it , which is closely related to bidder competition, can change 
quite dramatically, even over relatively short time periods, and the rates of change clearly 
differ across countries. As we shall see in the next section, the growth in FDI stocks has 
been notably lower due to increased bidder competition. 
The problem is similar to the one pointed out in Novy (2008): When estimating 
gravity equations for trade in goods, it is necessary to control for changes in multilateral 
resistance. For FDI, the problem is accentuated, since the reductions in 
FDI
it  are 
proportionally larger than the changes in inferred multilateral resistance reported by a 
similar inference procedure in Novy (2008) The debate in the trade literature on how to 
correct for time-variant multilateral resistance has not yet reached a conclusion. Correcting 
by including country-year fixed effects solves the problem, but it may require estimating 
Figure 5: Inferred aggregate barriers to FDI for OECD countries 
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too many parameters. From inspection of the 
FDI
it  series, one might suggest the "cheaper" 
strategy of adding country-specific trends, most of the evolution in a country's overall 
barriers can be roughly approximated with a negative log-linear trend. In studies with long 
time periods, it may be necessary to inspect plots of 
FDI
it  to check for breaks in the trends. 
6 Decomposing the Growth of FDI 
Two countries may invest more in each other for three reasons: The bilateral barriers to FDI 
may fall, the two countries may experience economic growth, raising the nominal value of 
the desired FDI stock abroad, or finally, the relative attractiveness of mutual investment 
may increase because the two countries' barriers to the rest of the world have gone up, 
lowering the competition for assets in the two countries.   
FDI activities have indeed grown in recent years. With the time series for the inferred 
bilateral and overall barriers as well as total capital stocks at hand, it is possible to calculate 
the relative contributions of each of these three factors. Is the increase in FDI stocks mainly 
caused by lower costs of investing abroad, or is economic growth, in the form of domestic 
capital accumulation, driving the increase? 
Rewrite the product of the FDI stocks between country i and j as follows: 
 
jtit
jtit
iitjjt
jjtiit
jitijt
jitijt KK
KK
FF
FF
FF
FF    
 
The product of bilateral FDI stocks can then be expressed as 
 
  jtitFDIjtFDIitFDIijtjitijt KKFF 
2
 , 
  
that is, the two countries' domestic capital stock times the two countries' aggregate inward 
barriers to FDI times the bilateral openness squared. To get the contributions of each of 
these factors over time, take logs and difference with the desired time period: 
 
       jtitFDIjtFDIitFDIijtjitijt KKFF logloglog2log    (1.5) 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.15
21 
 
 
Table 4: Decomposing the annual growth of FDI, 1985-2008 
 
Annual growth in 
FDI stocks 
Contribution, change 
in FDI openness 
Contribution, growth 
in capital stocks 
Contribution, change 
in third-country 
barriers, bidder 
competition 
OECD average 41%    = 31%   (75%) + 13%   (32%) + -3%   (-7%) 
America 29%    = 19%   (66%) + 12%   (41%) + -2%   (-7%) 
Mexico 33%    = 23%   (69%) + 12%   (37%) + -2%   (-6%) 
Canada 26%    = 17%   (66%) + 11%   (43%) + -2%   (-9%) 
USA 28%    = 17%   (62%) + 12%   (43%) + -2%   (-6%) 
Oceania and South-East Asia 31%    = 21%   (67%) + 12%   (37%) + -2%   (-5%) 
Korea 47%    = 33%   (70%) + 15%   (33%) + -1%   (-3%) 
New Zealand 27%    = 19%   (70%) + 10%   (37%) + -2%   (-7%) 
Japan 27%    = 17%   (65%) + 11%   (40%) + -1%    (-5%) 
Australia 26%    = 16%   (62%) + 11%   (44%) + -2%   (-6%) 
Europe, rich 37%    = 30%   (80%) + 11%   (30%) + -4%   (-10%) 
Norway 44%    = 39%   (87%) + 11%   (26%) + -6%   (-13%) 
Sweden 39%    = 33%   (85%) + 11%   (27%) + -5%   (-12%) 
Austria 46%    = 37%   (81%) + 12%   (26%) + -3%   (-7%) 
Switzerland 29%    = 23%   (81%) + 11%   (37%) + -5%   (-18%) 
Netherlands 37%    = 29%   (79%) + 13%   (34%) + -5%   (-13%) 
Germany 33%    = 26%   (78%) + 10%   (30%) + -3%   (-8%) 
Denmark 36%    = 28%   (77%) + 11%   (32%) + -3%   (-9%) 
France 42%    = 32%   (77%) + 12%   (29%) + -2%   (-6%) 
Italy 39%    = 30%   (76%) + 11%   (28%) + -2%   (-5%) 
UK 29%    = 21%   (72%) + 11%   (39%) + -3%   (-11%) 
Europe, catch-up 45%    = 33%   (75%) + 14%   (31%) + -3%   (-6%) 
Iceland 52%    = 42%   (81%) + 15%   (29%) + -5%   (-10%) 
Spain 53%    = 41%   (77%) + 14%    (27%) + -2%   (-4%) 
Portugal  39%    = 29%   (74%) + 14%   (34%) + -3%   (-8%) 
Finland 35%    = 25%   (72%) + 12%   (34%) + -2%   (-6%) 
Ireland 44%    = 30%   (67%) + 15%   (33%) + -0%   (-1%) 
Central and Eastern Europe 55%    = 43%   (79%) + 14%   (26%) + -3%   (-5%) 
Poland 67%    = 55%   (81%) + 15%   (23%) + -3%   (-4%) 
Czech Rep. 49%    = 40%   (81%) + 13%   (26%) + -4%   (-8%) 
Slovakia 65%    = 52%   (80%) + 16%   (24%) + -3%   (-4%) 
Hungary 49%    = 39%   (78%) + 14%   (28%) + -3%   (-6%) 
Turkey 48%    = 36%   (76%) + 14%   (29%) + -2%   (-4%) 
Greece 49%    = 37%   (75%) + 15%   (30%)  -3%   (-6%) 
Decomposition, according to equation (1.5), of the growth in the product of bilateral FDI stocks, averaged 
for each country (unweighted) across country pairs. Shares of total contribution in parentheses. In each 
group, countries are ordered according to the share of FDI growth that is explained by declining barriers.  
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Table 4 presents these contributions of bilateral barriers  FDIijt , third-country effects 
 FDIjtFDIit   and capital stocks (KitKjt) in the growth of FDI stocks between 1985 and 
2008.
10
 The growth rates are annualized and averaged across country pairs.  
The first observation is the dominance of falling bilateral barriers as drivers of the 
growth of FDI, they typically explain three quarters of the FDI growth. Jacks, Novy and 
Meissner (2011) do a similar decomposition for trade flows. For the period 1950-2000, they 
find that falling trade costs (inferred in the same manner as FDI openness in this paper) 
explain only 31% of the growth in trade, the rest being attributable to economic growth. 
Novy (2008) reports similar numbers for specific country pairs involving the US over the 
period 1970-2000, falling trade costs explain on average 40% of the growth in trade. 
In fact, the numbers in table 4 are more in line with what happened to international 
trade in the period 1870-1913, the so-called first wave of globalization. In this period world 
trade boomed, and Jacks, Novy and Meissner (20011) show that 60% of that expansion 
could be attributed to falling trade costs. A policy lesson can be drawn from this analogy: 
As the collapse in global trade following the First World War and the Great Depression has 
shown, an expansion in trade or FDI which is driven by reduced bilateral costs is more 
fragile. Barriers can be re-erected. Although trade costs in the late 19th century fell both for 
technological and political reasons, the protectionist era of 1921-39 brought trade costs 
back to their pre-Victorian level (see Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2011)). 
Table 4 also reveals that for some countries, falling FDI barriers have played a 
smaller role. As the regional averages reveal, these countries are non-European, with 
Ireland as the only exception. Countries that have a contribution share from 
FDI
ijt  below 
70% also have lower than average growth in FDI, again Ireland is the exception. The 
correlation between the growth in FDI stocks and the share explained by 
FDI
ijt  is 0.58. In 
line with these numbers Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2011) find that within Europe, falling 
trade costs explain a larger share, 52%, of the growth in trade between 1950 and 2000. 
All bilateral investment stocks are suppressed by the decline in third-country barriers, 
FDI stocks have grown by 1% to 5% less per year because of crowding out. The negative 
contribution tends to be larger for small open economies. 
7 Further Uses of Inferred FDI Barriers 
Inferred FDI barriers have uses beyond the direct explorations that are the focus of this 
paper. In related fields, it can be used as an explanatory or control variable. How do FDI 
barriers predict trade in goods, migration, or similar cross-border phenomena? Of particular 
interest here is perhaps the residual from the regressions in section 1.4. Do unexplained 
barriers to FDI correlate with trade flows or migration stocks? 
                                               
10 Following the discussion in footnote 5, an inflow into i of greenfield FDI from a country j will be attributed 
both to a decline in the bilateral barrier, to an increase in the capital stock in i and to an increase in bidder 
competition (fall in FDI
it ), with the latter two exactly offsetting each other. The Greenfield FDI inflow 
generated more capital in i, but this new capital is owned by country j, and other countries h ≠ j therefore own 
a lower share of the capital in i, mechanically generating more bidder competition for the total capital in i. 
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Models like Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2010) need barriers to FDI as inputs, and 
inferred barriers to FDI are an easy and straightforward way to calibrate these models, see 
Eaton, Kortum, Neuman and Romalis (2010) for a similar application of inferred trade 
costs.  
Finally, the methodology of inferring barriers, applied here to FDI, can be applied 
elsewhere. The gravity equation describes very well how many economic and social 
activities propagate across space, examples include migration, traffic, tourism, and social 
interactions. In principle, we can use the inference procedure to study the barriers to all 
these phenomena, the only conditions being that we can measure a location's "interaction 
with itself" meaningfully, and that the locations' interactions are not too unbalanced (an 
issue for tourism, for example). 
We may of course wish for theoretical foundations for why the gravity equation 
describes a given phenomena before applying the inference procedure, and the above 
analysis also shows the usefulness of a theoretical framework. On the other hand, social 
science theory is not formed in isolation from empirical insights, and any theory of, say, 
social interactions across space that predicts a pattern at odds with an empirical regularity 
as strong as the gravity equation would be hard to believe. 
8 Conclusion 
Many barriers to FDI are inherently difficult to observe, but this paper circumvents the 
problem by inferring the barriers from FDI data. The resulting measure is easy to compute 
and analyze, and the results presented in this paper are difficult to obtain in any other way. 
The methodology relies on the gravity equation, one of the strongest and most well-
documented empirical relationships in economics, and works whatever theory one believes 
rationalizes that relationship. 
The approach uncovers how barriers to FDI have been declining among virtually all 
of the 324 OECD country pairs examined. This universal decline suggests either 
technological explanations, OECD-wide policy liberalizations, or a combination of the two. 
The decline in FDI barriers has been faster for ―catch-up‖ countries (Finland, Iceland, 
Ireland, Portugal, Korea and Spain) and ―emerging‖ countries (Czech Rep., Slovak Rep., 
Hungary, Poland, Greece, Turkey and Mexico). 
Regressing the inferred barriers to FDI on variables which the previous literature has 
found to impede or encourage FDI enables an assessment of the importance of each. The 
regressions confirm the importance of geography and language; FDI barriers are 
dramatically lower if two countries used to be one, or if one colonized the other in the past. 
The hypothesis from the proximity-concentration literature that large markets attract more 
FDI also receives support. The main determinants of FDI barriers are country-specific, 
however. Countries with very low corporate taxes are especially successful at attracting 
FDI, while countries with low GDP per capita tend to have high barriers. The crucial role 
played by GDP per capita (it is also an important determinant of bilateral barriers) warrants 
further investigation.  
Decomposition reveals that the main driver of the growth in FDI from 1985 to 2008 
has been falling barriers, economic growth in the form of capital accumulation is less than 
half as important. Moreover, the decomposition reveals a crowding-out effect on FDI: Had 
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there been an infinite stock of firms to acquire in each country, bilateral FDI stocks would 
have grown by 3% more each year. If this crowding-out is not controlled for, estimates of 
e.g. the FDI-impeding effect of distance will be biased upwards.  
In sum, applying the technique of inferred barriers, which is widely used in 
international trade, to FDI has provided substantial insights into the size, distribution and 
evolution of the barriers to FDI, as well as the constituents of these barriers. I confirm and 
nuance results from existing studies of FDI barriers and provide novel results, which are 
hard to obtain using other methods. 
 
 
Table A1. The components of bilateral barriers to FDI, log-log regressions.   Dependent variable: ijt
FDI  
Specification 1 2, (i, j)-FE 3 4, (i, j)-FE 5, (it, jt)-FE 
 coeff. 
(std. error) 
%-effect 
[t-stat] 
coeff.  
(std. error) 
%-effect 
[z-stat] 
coeff.  
(std. error) 
%-effect 
[z-stat] 
coeff.  
(std. error) 
%-effect 
[z-stat] 
coeff.  
(std. error) 
%-effect 
[z-stat] 
Distanceij -0.72 
(0.03)a 
 
[-22.7] 
-0.71 
(0.03)a 
 
[-21.2] 
-0.73  
(0.03)a 
  
[-27.8] 
-0.70  
(0.03)a 
  
[-21.2] 
-0.69  
(0.03)a 
  
[-20.1] 
Neighborsij (0,1) 0.28  
(0.10)a   
32% 
[2.8] 
 0.64 
(0.07)a 
49%  
[9.1] 
 0.37 
(0.07)a 
45%  
[4.5] 
 0.64 
(0.07)a 
89%  
[9.2] 
 0.66 
(0.07)a 
94%  
[9.1] 
Common languageij (0,1)  2.43  
(0.11)a  
1031% 
[23.1] 
 0.31 
(0.08)a 
36%  
[4.0] 
 1.62 
(0.06)a 
404%  
[18.1] 
 0.32 
(0.08)a 
37%  
[4.2] 
 0.36 
(0.08)a 
43%  
[4.4] 
Colonial pastij (0,1)  -0.11 
(0.14) 
 
[-0.8] 
 1.43 
(0.10)a  
319% 
[14.9] 
 0.22 
(0.09)c 
25% 
[1.9] 
 1.43 
(0.10)a 
318% 
[17.3] 
 1.40 
(0.10)a 
307% 
[14.1] 
GDPit×GDPjt  0.50 
(0.02)a 
 
[29.4] 
 1.11 
(0.17)a  
  
[6.5]       
(Per capita GDPit) 
 × (Per capita GDPjt)     
 2.89 
(0.06)a 
  
[51.5] 
 1.68 
(0.17)a 
  
[9.9] 
 1.62 
(0.39)a 
  
[4.1] 
(Population in 1985i) 
 × (Population in 1985j)     
 0.46 
(0.03)a  
  
[32.2] 
 0.61 
(0.03)a  
  
[12.4] 
 2.33 
(0.62)a  
  
[3.8] 
Year dummies (t) Yes  [sum 57.5] Yes  [sum 62.5] Yes  [sum 31.0] Yes  [sum 56.8] 
Country fixed effects  
(ci and cj). No Yes  [sum 321.3] No Yes  [sum 367.3] 
Country-year 
dummies, (cit, cjt) 
[sum 882.1] 
R2  0.325 0.778 0.532 0.781  0.832  
4269 observations. %-effect: Percentage change in ijt
FDI  when independent variable goes from 0 to 1, calculated as exp(-b) – 1. 
Estimation method: Ordinary least squares (with and without fixed effects), estimated coefficients are elasticities.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Square parentheses contain a t-statistics, corresponding to the explanatory variables' importance in 
explaining the variation in the dependent variable. a ,b,c: significant at 1%, 5% and 10%-level, respectively.  
 
For comparison, Table A1 reports the results of running the regressions from table 2 in log-
log rather than Poisson quasi maximum likelihood. The signs and degree of significance are 
the same as in Table 2a, except that neighbors is significant now in specification 1. The 
distance elasticities are larger, and the coefficients for common language and colonial past 
are implausibly high. It is worth noting that these biases go in the same direction, as what 
Santos Silvo and Tenreyro (2006) find in gravity equations for trade flows. 
There is an additional regression, column 5, here the error term is specified as  
 
  exp(γt)ηijt = exp(cit)exp(cjt)ζijt. 
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The only clear change in coefficients when using country-year fixed effects is for 
population, here there is a markedly higher coefficient (2.33 vs 0.61), but low t-stat.. The 
other coefficients have roughly the same (biased) values. 
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